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It is often held that vision is purely present-tensed; that vision informs us only 
about how objects in our environment are (more or less) right now. It is not hard 
to tell why this thought is so popular. Just look around and reflect on what you 
see. I predict that you will get the appeal. 
As natural as this thought might be, it is mistaken – at least, so says 
Michael Madary. Madary’s thesis can be stated simply: 
 
(AF) Visual perception is an ongoing process of anticipation and fulfillment. 
 
In a nutshell, what is distinctive about (AF) is the idea that vision is partly 
future-tensed. For (AF) posits visual contents that involve anticipation – that is, 
visual contents that are not just about how the objects of vision are right now, 
but also about how these objects will (appear to) be as the perceiver visually 
explores them from different perspectives. As time passes, these future-tensed 
visual contents will normally end up either being fulfilled or being thwarted. 
What is especially impressive about Madary’s arguments for (AF) is their 
range. Madary buttresses (AF) with evidence from armchair phenomenology, 
from perceptual psychology, from neuroscience, and even from the Husserlian 
tradition. That strategy – of supporting one claim with many firm pillars – is 
one to be greatly admired, and in this book it is executed very well. 
 Madary advances (AF) as a claim not only about the causal processes that 
enable vision, but also as a claim about the phenomenology of vision – as a claim 
about what it’s like to visually perceive (3). There is, however, some unclarity 
about what (AF) means. Madary tells us that (AF) is a thesis about the structure 
of vision (3), but it is not clear to me precisely how this metaphor is to be 
literally interpreted. It is tempting to interpret the metaphor as saying that part 
of what it is, metaphysically speaking, to be a visual perception is to be an 
ongoing process of anticipation and fulfillment. But this interpretation seems to 
be incorrect, for Madary seems to remain neutral about even the weaker claim 
that (AF) is a metaphysically necessary truth (4). Madary does say that “all 
visual perception of the external environment involves anticipation and 
fulfillment” (p. 39, emphasis mine), so perhaps the talk of “structure” is just 
meant to indicate that Madary takes (AF) to be a true universal generalization 
about vision? I am not sure.1 
                                                 
1 One problem with this interpretation: Madary later contrasts claims about the structure of vision 
with claims about the contents of vision (157). But if structural features of vision are just universal 
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 Madary’s arguments for (AF) come in two main bundles. The arguments 
in the first bundle are primarily phenomenological (chs. 2-4), while the 
arguments in the second bundle are primarily empirical (chs. 5-7). From there, 
Madary goes on to address objections (ch. 8), to suggest that visual perception is 
social (ch. 9), and to situate (AF) against the thought of Husserl (appendix). 
Limitations of space – but not of interest! – preclude me from examining all of 
this. I will just tour a few landmarks. 
Phenomenological arguments for (AF). Madary identifies several 
phenomenological constraints on a theory of vision. First, vision is perspectival, in 
the sense that as you change your perspective on a perceived object, the object 
will typically look different to you in certain salient respects (28). Second, vision 
is temporal, in the sense that vision “appears to be continuous over time” rather 
than appearing to be “… a series of discrete snapshots” (33). Third, vision is 
substantially indeterminate, in the sense that any visual perception of a scene is 
compatible with multiple determinate ways that the scene might be (36-7). 
Madary suggests that all visual perceptions have these three qualities, and I am 
inclined to agree. 
Madary goes on to argue that (AF) would perspicuously explain why all 
visual perceptions have these three qualities (38-9). Once we accept (AF), we can 
say that vision is perspectival because vision involves the anticipation of how 
objects will look from different perspectives; we can say that vision is temporal 
because these anticipations are continuously “stirred up,”2 and either fulfilled or 
thwarted, as we explore our environments; and we can say that vision is 
substantially indeterminate because these anticipations themselves vary 
substantially in their determinacy. 
I worry that these considerations do not give especially strong support to 
(AF) over its rivals. For, as you will recall, what is distinctive about (AF) is the 
idea that vision is partly future-tensed. But vision could obviously be 
perspectival and substantially indeterminate without being in any way future-
tensed. Vision could even be temporal in the sense that Madary describes – in the 
sense of seeming continuous over time – without being in any way future-tensed. 
But I think that I find in Madary another phenomenological argument 
for (AF).3 Madary asks us to imagine two subjects, Lily and Rosemary, who each 
walk around a particular sculpture, viewing it carefully. Imagine that Lily and 
Rosemary each visually attend to precisely the same features of the sculpture, in 
the same order, for the same period of time; their visual systems have the same 
                                                 
features of vision, then it is not clear why there would be a contrast here – surely there could be 
universal features of the contents of vision. 
 In personal correspondence, Madary clarifies, “It seems to me that what I have in mind 
with the structure of vision could perhaps be described as universal features of the content of 
vision…. my view is that visual content must have this structure if it is to show up for us as 
contentful, as being intentionally directed to the world.” 
2 Madary borrows this fine metaphor from Husserl. 
3 Officially, Madary presents the remarks below as an illustration of (AF) rather than as an 
argument for (AF), but I suggest that Madary is understating the force of his remarks here. 
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degree of acuity, and they even generate the same muscle movements as they 
walk (54-5). Must Lily and Rosemary have the same visual perceptions? 
Many standard theorists of perception would answer yes. Madary 
answers no. For suppose that Lily is not especially familiar with modern art 
sculptures, while Rosemary is very knowledgeable – she even has an intimate 
familiarity with other works by the same creator. Then Rosemary will likely 
have much more determinate anticipations than Lily about how the sculpture 
will look as she walks around it. To embellish Madary’s example, Rosemary 
might expect to see certain signatures of the artist: a pattern of fine wrinkling, a 
sharp contrast between glossy and dull metals, a lightness to the overall 
composition. As she examines the sculpture, her anticipations will be stirred up 
and then either fulfilled or thwarted, and that will constitute a difference in what 
her visual perceptions are like. 
I feel the tug of this phenomenological argument. For in the case of Lily 
and Rosemary, it is very natural to explain the differences in their 
phenomenologies by appealing to differences in the future-tensed contents of 
their visual perceptions. It is very natural to appeal to differences in future-tensed 
contents because, plausibly, Rosemary will not only notice different features 
regarding how the sculpture is now, but will also have different expectations 
about how the sculpture will appear as she explores it. 
It is, of course, an interesting question whether there are alternative 
ways of explaining the differences in their phenomenologies.4 
Empirical arguments for (AF). I am delighted by the breadth of Madary’s 
empirical arguments for (AF). If I may offer you just a taste: Madary claims that 
(AF) helps to explain phenomenal overflow (79-83), saccade patterns (99-102), 
selective rearing results (102-3), reversing goggle results (102-3), intrinsic 
cortical activity (119-23), massive feedback connectivity (123-5), and differences 
between dorsal and ventral visual processing (131-51). Of these many pieces of 
empirical evidence, let us choose just two to sample. 
One piece of empirical evidence for (AF) comes from observations about 
saccades – rapid eye movements which typically occur, without conscious 
direction, many times per second. Madary observes that saccades are highly 
task-dependent. For example, in one experiment it was discovered that for 
subjects making tea, nearly every saccade served some task-relevant purpose: 
“locating objects, directing and guiding movements, or checking the state of a 
task-relevant variable” (100). Madary reports similar results in a wide range of 
empirically studied cases. Why does Madary take the task-dependence of 
saccades to support (AF)? Because the task-dependence of saccades can be well 
explained by the hypothesis that “subjects have implicit knowledge about 
precisely where to look in order to gain information relevant for their goals” 
(102), and (AF) posits future-tensed contents of just this kind. 
                                                 
4 For example, you might instead appeal to differences in their beliefs about how the sculpture will 
appear. You might also deny that there are differences in their phenomenologies, properly 
speaking; you might say that the only differences are in their non-phenomenological perceptual 
contents. Madary argues against these approaches throughout ch. 3. 
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Another piece of empirical evidence that Madary offers for (AF) is drawn 
from an empirically promising model of perception, the Bayesian predictive 
processing model. According to this model, “sensory input is continuously 
predicted by an internal generative model. If the prediction is not correct, an 
error signal propagates upward through levels of the hierarchy until the internal 
model is revised in a way that accommodates the error signal” (113). The 
Bayesian predictive processing model is supported by several facts about 
neurology – for example, the fact that hierarchical regions in the brain are 
connected by massive feedback structures (123-5). If the brain is continually 
making and testing predictions about incoming perceptual information, then we 
have an explanation for the existence of these massive feedback structures (126). 
Madary notes that the precise significance of the existence of massive 
feedback structures is unclear and is the topic of much ongoing investigation 
(125). Still, I agree with him that (AF), understood merely as a hypothesis about 
the causal processes underlying vision, is one promising explanation. 
In sum, I find (AF) to be very promising when it is understood as a 
hypothesis about the causal processes that enable vision. I am less confident 
about – though still intrigued by – (AF) when it is understood as a hypothesis 
about visual phenomenology. I am certain, however, that Madary’s book has 
wonderfully advanced the discussion. 
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